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New Zealand and the South Pacific
Ramesh Thakur
Our South Pacific policy is a most important part of our over-
all external relations, but it serves too a definite purpose in
underpinning New Zealand's credentials in the larger world.
RUSSELL MARSHALL, SOUTH PACIFIC ROLE FOR NEW ZEALAND
The confetti of island nations flung across the vast seascape of the South
Pacific in a sense came of age in the second half of the 1980s. Previously,
the islands had been shielded from the harsh realities of international poli-
tics and the advertising slogan "Fiji-The Way the World Should Be" was
applicable to the region generally. The region's innocence was lost in a
series of events that introduced political assassination, kidnapping,
hijacking, sabotage, gun-running, and coups. Peoples of the South Pacific
could only rue the transition from the fantasy world of a Rodgers and
Hammerstein musical to the grim realities of modern international life.
The old slogans were no longer appropriate. Along with them went the
old certainties. The era of tranquility had given way to an era of turbu-
lence.
The Pacific Islands now engage the entire gamut of New Zealand's
interests. As New Zealanders began to see themselves less as European
settlers and more as Pacific inhabitants, a process that began with World
War II and was intensified with Britain's entry to the European Economic
Community, a closer identification with and involvement in their immedi-
ate region was inevitable. After all, New Caledonia is closer to New
Zealand than is Australia. The troubles that hit the region hastened the
process of refocusing New Zealand foreign policy on its immediate neigh-
borhood and gave it added urgency. Where once only politicians with
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exceptional peripheral vision might have been expected to look at the
Pacific Islands, by the I990S there was general recognition that the region
provided New Zealand with a social and political context and could rep-
resent its future. Significantly, Don McKinnon, the minister of external
relations and trade in the National government that came to power
toward the end of I990, made his first overseas trip to Fiji, Niue, and the
Cook Islands in January I99I, accompanied by Defence Minister Warren
Cooper.
Unsettling incidents in the Pacific Islands and a growing awareness of
New Zealand's Pacific identity coincided with momentous changes in
global international relations. It had become clear by the start of the I990S
that world politics would no longer rotate around the axis of superpower
rivalry. Instead, the international agenda would be dominated by interna-
tional concerns and regional conflicts, and the nature of those concerns
would be transformed. Visions and minds have turned increasingly to
grappling with issues of resource management, environmental protection,
and the basics of health, shelter, food, and development rather than mili-
tary security.
New Zealand has security, economic, political, and environmental
interests in the South Pacific. These arise from geographical proximity, a
shared maritime environment, cultural and historical links between the
Polynesian populations of New Zealand and other Pacific Island states,
missionary and educational contacts, and trade, investment, and mi-
gration flows. At its broadest, the goal of New Zealand's policy is to
ensure that the Pacific Islands remain well disposed, friendly, stable, and
prosperous, and that they do not suffer serious environmental degrada-
tion.
SECURITY ISSUES
If the Soviet Union needed a buffer of communist states, why should those
buffer states not require a further ring of buffers of their own and so on
until only New Zealand was left to be buffed against? (Kennet I987, 209)
In the unlikely event of an invasion of New Zealand from the north, the
Pacific Islands could be used as stepping-stones. New Zealand's security
interests are therefore somewhat engaged in the island states immediately
to the north and northeast. In addition, and in partnership with its Aus-
tralian ally, New Zealand also has a strategic-cum-commercial interest in
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securing the long and exposed sea and air lanes of communication across
the Pacific vastness.
The most important security goal for New Zealand and Australia used
to be the strategic denial of the Pacific Islands to the Soviet Union. That
concern became increasingly attenuated during the 1980s and irrelevant
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Given the occasional
hysteria induced by Soviet fishing activities in the Pacific, it is ironic that
the earliest Soviet fishing agreements were with New Zealand. Both Aus-
tralia and New Zealand had been disturbed by Soviet offers of assistance
in 1976 to help Tonga and Western Samoa develop their fishing resources
in return for shore facilities for Soviet fishing vessels. Toward the end of
1977, Soviet officials argued that if they could be granted access to New
Zealand shore facilities they would not need to approach island govern-
ments for such privileges. New Zealand's keen desire to provide Soviet
access to New Zealand fish resources and shore facilities was equally
matched by its desire for access to the Soviet market for New Zealand
meat. In 1978 an agreement was signed for New Zealand to provide shore
facilities to Soviet vessels under strictly controlled conditions. The Soviet
Union was given access to existing facilities for provisioning, repairs, and
maintenance, and for the exchange of crews by air, on a commercial and
nonreciprocal basis.
Perhaps the long-term significance of the New Zealand-Soviet fishing
deal of the late 1970S can best be recognized with hindsight. First, it meant
that the Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe) became an option in the New
Zealand pursuit of market and product diversification made necessary by
Britain's membership in the European Economic Community. The success
of the strategy would lead to the creation of a commercial lobby in New
Zealand with a vested interest in maintaining good relations with the
Soviet Union. Second, it meant that for the first time New Zealand would
have its own dealings with the Soviet Union and would no longer be reli-
ant solely on the intelligence information and political assessments of its
major allies as the basis of its policy toward the Soviet Union. The two
strands together meant that New Zealand slowly but steadily developed
stable working relationships with the Eastern bloc.
The ramifications were felt in New Zealand in the 1984 election. For
example, Bob Jones, a property magnate and leader of what was then
called the New Zealand Party, noted that the Soviet Union was a major
trading partner, not an enemy. Why should the Soviets bother to invade
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New Zealand, he asked, when they could already get as much as they
wanted of New Zealand goods at subsidized prices? They realize, he
insisted, that to obtain the same products after invading and occupying
New Zealand, they would have to replace one of the most efficient sys-
tems of producing and distributing these commodities with one that had
already been proven inefficient. They would simply be getting products of
lesser quality at much higher cost.
While Bob Jones struck a responsive chord because of his economic
logic, others argued that Soviet scaremongering lacked strategic logic as
well. The Soviet Union was a formidable continental power in its home-
land, but even if it had the intention, it lacked the means to project its vast
power to the South Pacific. The sea assertion assets (maritime power and
sealift and airlift capabilities) of the Western alliance were incomparably
superior, and any Soviet maritime threat that might materialize would be
contained and defeated long before it crossed the equator. 1 Similarly, the
Soviet Union always lacked the ability to translate continental military
power into intercontinental political and economic influence. Pacific
Island leaders were not attracted to its political system, and its economic
record acted as an effective repellent to other countries adopting Soviet-
style methods. Nor were "objective" conditions and factors in the islands
suited to the cause of advancing Marxism.
Perhaps because of the confluence of these factors, New Zealand was
better prepared to be won over by the remarkable international diplomacy
of Mikhail Gorbachev sooner than were America or Australia. Coinciden-
tally, the first term of the Reagan administration in Washington alarmed
many New Zealanders. President Ronald Reagan seemed to believe that a
nuclear war with the evil empire was fightable, winnable, and desirable.
Convinced of the malignancy of Reaganite America's intentions toward
the Soviet Union, New Zealanders (along with many other allied publics)
began to view America as the greater threat to world peace.
One important difference separated New Zealand from other allied
countries. In recent times, the only plausible threat to New Zealand secu-
rity has lain in the possibility of the breakdown of nuclear peace between
the superpowers. It is extraordinarily difficult, even with the benefit of
hindsight-or perhaps because of the benefit of hindsight-to identify
genuine threats to New Zealand security over the past few decades. Con-
sequently, the simultaneous perception of a bellicose America under
Reagan and a peaceful Soviet Union under Gorbachev (prepared to under-
take unilateral initiatives in an effort to avert nuclear disaster) had the net
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effect of undermining the strategic basis of the ANZUS alliance for New
Zealand.
With the threat from the Soviet Union disappearing along with that
country, 2 what other sources of potential attack might be identified for
New Zealand? The short answer is none. Those that might have the inten-
tion lack the means to project hostile power across such vast distances and
cutting across the vital interests of many intervening powers. Conversely,
if malignant intentions are inferred/rom capabilities, the only three coun-
tries capable of threatening New Zealand at present or in the foreseeable
future are Australia, Japan, and the United States. Australia and New
Zealand have long formed a security community. War between them in
reality would be civil rather than international. Although civil wars are
not unknown in international relations, not even the most fanatic nation-
alist in New Zealand would suggest that there is any possibility of rela-
tions between the two countries deteriorating to the point where hostilities
could begin: sport is a very useful substitute.
It is a very long time since many New Zealanders regarded Japan as a
potential threat, and this was the reason for the removal of yet another
strategic plank of ANZUS. Whereas only a minority of New Zealanders
view the United States with suspicion, their feelings can be intense enough
to constitute genuine hostility. In the series of public opinion polls com-
missioned by the Corner committee, a surprising 14 percent of New
Zealanders cited the United States as the most likely source of danger to
New Zealand security, compared to 31 percent who cited the USSR (Cor-
ner 1986, 40).3 Nevertheless, this is not the opinion of the majority of New
Zealanders, nor of officials, nor of the government.
All these benign perceptions of New Zealand's strategic environment
came together in the 1987 Defence White Paper. New Zealand, the White
Paper asserted confidently, faced no prospect of invasion in the foresee-
able future (NZDD 1987, 6). At a lower threshold, three types of security
threats from the South Pacific can be identified. The most direct but least
likely is outright attack or invasion of a Pacific island by an external
power. Such an eventuality would have particular cogency for New
Zealand because of its special constitutional responsibilities for the
defense of entities such as the Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue. But
because of its low probability, it does not much exercise the minds of secu-
rity planners in Wellington.
The second possibility is that a serious internal security threat or rebel-
lion would break out in a Pacific island country. As well as posing a threat
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to the security of the island state, such a development could also endanger
the lives of New Zealand nationals. This presumably is one of the con-
tingencies for which the Ready Reaction Force trains. During the confused
situation in Fiji after the coup of May I987, Prime Minister David Lange
made it clear that if New Zealanders were in danger, then New Zealand
troops would intervene, with or without the permission of the governor-
general of Fiji. (In I992 the New Zealand press broke the story of a serious
difference of opinion between Prime Minister David Lange and the New
Zealand defense forces on the advisability of a commando raid to rescue
an Air New Zealand plane that had been hijacked to Nadi, Fiji, on I9 May
I987. The military leaned toward greater caution than the prime minister
[So Evans I992a; I992b; I992C]). As was the case in Fiji at the time, it is
inconceivable that any future situation that posed a threat to the lives of
New Zealand nationals would not pose an equal danger to Australian
nationals. Therefore, any response would almost certainly be a joint Aus-
tralian-New Zealand response. Again, I would be surprised to learn that
the two countries' forces were not prepared and trained for such emergen-
cies. (But then I was surprised at how ill prepared the two countries were
for a coup in Fiji: I thought that was an entirely predictable development,
although the timing and author could not have been identified in
advance.)
The final Pacific-based threat scenario is that of long-term instability
resulting from a persistent economic, tribal, geographical, or racial
divide. One potential for this of course is in Fiji. Or rather, two potentials:
between Fiji-Indians and Fijians; and between Fijians themselves from dif-
ferent regions or confederacies. In I992 a more likely location for such a
threat seemed to be Bougainville (see Wesley-Smith I992).
New Zealand neither has nor has sought a regional defense pact or
security arrangement to underpin the premier political institutions of the
South Pacific. But New Zealand does talk about and engage in a certain
amount of consultation and cooperation on defense and security matters
affecting the region. The programs of security assistance to Pacific Islands
and maritime and aerial patrol and surveillance are all designed to pre-
clude threats from materializing, and, should they show signs of develop-
ing, to provide early warning of their gathering menace in the incipient
stages. It is a safe bet that should policymakers perceive a deterioration in
the regional security environment, programs of regional defense coopera-
tion would intensify.
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There has been a shift in security focus since the change of government
in New Zealand in 1990. Interestingly, the National government's 1991
White Paper on defense did not dispute the previous government's asser-
tion in the 1987 White Paper that New Zealand faces no direct threat to its
security. Few outside powers possess the logistical and combat capabilities
to be able to mount an invasion of New Zealand across vast distances.
Consequently, "the threat of invasion ... is not the main determinant of
a New Zealand defence strategy" (NZDD 1991, 48). Defining the South
Pacific as New Zealand's geographic area of operations has the advantage
of concentrating the capabilities and training needed by the defense forces.
Even in the South Pacific, however, internal threats will be more potent
than external ones.
Where the previous government took comfort from geographical isola-
tion, the present government argues that a scattering of security interests
over considerable distances means that New Zealand must have a wide
defense focus. Geographical remoteness keeps threats at a distance, and
also complicates defense planning for long and exposed lines of communi-
cation to trading, political, and cultural partners. According to Prime
Minister Jim Bolger, the Labour government had taken New Zealand too
far in the direction of an inward-looking isolationism and regionalism.
Such an outlook is unsustainable, in the view of the Bolger government,
because the country's interests are global, shared, and capable of advance-
ment only in cooperation with others. Playing its proper part in alliances,
far from subordinating them, promotes New Zealand interests. Conse-
quently, the government has decided to return New Zealand to an interna-
tionalist posture (NZDD 1991, 5). Asked about the impact of New
Zealand's antinuclear law and policy in the South Pacific, Foreign Minis-
ter Don McKinnon said that it was considered unhelpful by the Cook
Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Western
Samoa, and viewed antagonistically by Tonga. According to him, a func-
tioning ANZUS alliance would enable New Zealand to interact more
authoritatively with the Pacific Islands (McKinnon 1992).
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Security considerations suggest that New Zealand-whose trade is almost
totally sea-borne: 99 percent by volume and 90 percent by value (NZDD
1991, 22)-will continue to strive to maintain the Pacific Islands as a
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buffer against potential threats to its sea lanes. New Zealand therefore has
a vested security interest in the continued viability of the Pacific Island
states. As the I980s progressed, there was a noticeable tendency among
policymakers in Wellington to keep broadening their conception of secu-
rity in the South Pacific, embracing economic, political, and environmen-
tal dimensions as well as military ones (see Graham I992, Marshall I988).
Attempts by New Zealand to claim shared community with the Pacific
Islands face one difficult obstacle. The Western model of economic pro-
duction in New Zealand distinguishes it too sharply from the subsistence
economies of the Pacific Islands. Most Forum island countries have nar-
rowly based economies and consequently are overly dependent on remit-
tances, foreign aid, and budget support grants for the maintenance and
viability of even minimal levels of government services and infrastructural
support. While their economies have been static or have even declined, aid
dependency has increased, although levels of external assistance have not
risen (Figure I). Donor countries also have been hit by resource con-
straints and heightened competition for scarcer funds. Demands for aid
from Eastern Europe and the former USSR in particular have been com-
peting for higher priority than demands from countries in remoter corners
of the world. The end of the Cold War has also removed an important lev-
erage used to good effect in the past by island governments that sought
external assistance from competing blocs. This only serves to increase the
importance of new sources of foreign aid.
New Zealand's total official development assistance was NZ$I4I.8 mil-
lion in I988-89, NZ$I48.7 million in I990-9I, and NZ$I46.5 million in
I99I-92. The I99I-92 figure is equivalent to about 0.2I percent of gross
domestic product, one of the lowest proportions among aid donors. Don
McKinnon, who is both foreign minister and Pacific Island affairs minis-
ter, argues that the proportion of aid must not be allowed to fall below
0.20 percent of gross domestic product-a far more modest goal than the
parliamentary select committee's target of 0.36 percent, let alone the long-
established United Nations target of 0.7 percent (McKinnon I992). Some
argue that the volume of aid given is less important than its quality, and
that the more salient questions for New Zealand are the feasibility of
projects, the efficacy of aid, and the absorptive capacity of recipients.
McKinnon, for example, speaks with pride of a beekeeping project in
Papua New Guinea set up with the help of New Zealand hives and exper-
tise. The project is now self-sustaining and has provided a base of eco-
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FIGURE 1. Major aid donors to Forum Island Countries, 1984-1989. (Current US$
millions). Multilateral donors include the World Bank, the European Commu-
nity, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Plan.
Source: OECD data provided by New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and
Trade, 1992.
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nomic activities to the target area (McKinnon 1992). On the other hand,
he has also acknowledged that the retreat into the "quality is better than
quantity" argument could be a debating point to deflect criticism of the
small amount of New Zealand aid. To some extent too the government
has tried to offset declining New Zealand aid by helping the South Pacific
tap into multilateral assistance programs for funding such activities as the
South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme. In 1991-92, New
Zealand's bilateral aid amounted to 85 percent of its total official develop-
ment assistance. In turn, about 70 percent of New Zealand's bilateral aid
was allocated to the Pacific Islands, including development projects,
budgetary support, and study and training awards (Figure 2a). Within the
South Pacific, for reasons of historical association or continuing special
constitutional links, there is clearly a Polynesian focus to New Zealand
aid (Figure Ib). As for regional programs, New Zealand is the second-
largest donor to the Forum Secretariat, providing 37 percent of its core
budget (NZMERT 1991b, 21). The other major items of expenditure in New
Zealand's aid to the region are on the South Pacific Commission (NZ$2.1
million in 1991-92), the University of the South Pacific (NZ$2.6 million),
and Pacific third country training (Nz$3 million). The details of the Pacific
Island students who were awarded New Zealand scholarships during 1983
to 1989 are given in Table 1.4
New Zealand remains one of the major aid donors to the region as a
whole (Figure I), and its aid is especially important to a select few Polyne-
sian recipients. If all South Pacific Commission members are included
among the recipients, the ranking of the major bilateral aid donors is
France, Australia, United States, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom
(Parliament of Australia 1989, 77). But 98 percent of the French and US
aid to the Pacific Islands is given to their dependent territories in the
region. If only the thirteen island members of the South Pacific Forum are
included, then the aid donor rankings for the past five years are Australia,
Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the top four, with
France, Germany, and the United States some distance behind (NZMERT
1992). In the past decade, New Zealand has faced two constraints on the
size of its aid programs relative to the other major aid donors to the Pacific
Islands. First, its economy has been in a prolonged recession, forcing
severe budget cuts in every area of government spending. Second, the New
Zealand dollar has declined steadily and substantially over the decade,
thereby depressing the value of New Zealand's aid relative to that from
other donors.
A: By region and category
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FIGURE 2. New Zealand overseas development aid recipients, 1991-92.
(NZ$ millions). Source: From data provided by New Zealand Ministry
of External Relations and Trade, 1992.
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Table I. Official Development Assistance Students in New Zealand from Forum
Island Countries, 1983-1989
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Cook Islands 58 35 44 54 35 43 45
Fiji 61 55 76 87 48 49 65
Kiribati 19 15 13 18 15 17 19
Marshall Islands 1 2 2
Micronesia 2 1 2 4
Niue 33 47 51 56 23 40 49
Papua New Guinea 21 15 18 18 19 16 27
Solomon Islands 23 30 29 39 21 34 37
Tonga 78 33 29 32 37 51 58
Tuvalu 15 6 11 19 19 21 27
Vanuatu 36 23 19 27 32 40 52
Western Samoa 191 91 97 112 66 92 112
TOTAL FORUM ISLAND
COUNTRIES 535 350 387 464 317 407 497
TOTAL ALL COUNTRIES 767 591 602 706 570 739 851
Source: New Zealand Hansard 1990, Il7-Il8.
Nor is aid an unmixed blessing: New Zealanders as well as some Pacific
Islanders worry about aid dependency and about the absorptive capacity
of recipients who may be the object of too much donor attention. (The
South Pacific receives exceptionally high volumes of aid on a per capita
basis.) Aid confers certain benefits on New Zealand as well, as noted by
Foreign Minister McKinnon: more than 70 percent of New Zealand's
bilateral aid to the region flows straight back for the purchase of goods
and services in the donor country; the legacy of years of aid to the region
includes a number of island leaders who are positively disposed toward
the country in which they were educated; and the promotion of economic
prosperity and social stability expands New Zealand's potential markets
and assists in stabilizing its strategic environment (McKinnon 1992).
Moving from aid to trade, it is surprising that trade with the South
Pacific accounts for less than 2 percent of total New Zealand trade. New
Zealand is not all that important as a trading partner of the Forum island
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countries (Naisali 1991). Australia, the European Community, Japan, and
the newly industrializing countries of Asia are the really important trading
partners of the Pacific Island states.
The vehicle for promoting regional trade with New Zealand (and Aus-
tralia) is the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation
Agreement (SPARTECA), which provides nonreciprocal and unrestricted
duty-free access for all island products exported to New Zealand. Since I
July 1988 all Forum island countries' goods meeting the SPARTECA rules of
origin requirements5 have been allowed entry into the New Zealand mar-
ket free of duty and import licensing on a nonreciprocal basis. (Australian
quotas on certain import items like textiles, clothing, and footwear are
due to be lifted in 1996.) New Zealand also operates the Pacific Islands
Industrial Development Scheme, whereby New Zealand companies are
given financial assistance and incentives for the development of approved
manufacturing operations in Pacific Island countries. The goal of the
scheme is to foster economic development and to expand employment
opportunities in the islands. For all this, a pronounced structural imbal-
ance remains in the trade between New Zealand and the South Pacific,
with exports to the islands almost four times more than imports.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The indefinite perpetuation of trade imbalances can generate resentment
and sour political relations. By global standards, New Zealand is a mod-
est power. By regional standards, however, it is a metropolitan power of
considerable size, affluence, influence, and therefore importance. Conse-
quently, New Zealand policy pronouncements and actions produce dis-
proportionate effects in the South Pacific compared to elsewhere, and
New Zealand's regional diplomacy has had to be qualitatively different
from its general diplomacy. In particular, New Zealand has had to be
attuned to regional aspirations and sensibilities. It has striven for this by
means of regular and systematic visits by politicians and officials to the
islands to listen and learn. For example, New Zealand is the only country
that sends officials annually to each island capital for bilateral exchanges
on political and security issues.
The number of diplomatic posts maintained by New Zealand is the best
illustration of the political importance to it of the Pacific Islands, for three
reasons. First, given the salience of the Pacific Island countries in world
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Table 2. The Regional Distribution of New Zealand's Diplomatic Posts
(as of September 1991)
Region Posts':- Personnelt
Number Percent Number Percent
The Americas 7 15 38 13
Australia 4 9 31 11
Europe (including Russia) 10 21 71 24
Asia 10 21 77 26
Africa, Middle East, United Nations 6 13 32 11
Pacific Islands 10 21 44 15
TOTAL 47 100 293 100
Source: Data in NZMERT 199Ia.
':- Include all embassy, consular, trade, and tourism posts.
t Includes diplomatic, defense, immigration, trade, and tourism officials at all
levels, from typist to ambassador.
affairs, and that of some other regions, it is an extraordinary statistic that
New Zealand has the same number of posts in the Pacific Islands as in all
of Asia (including ASEAN) and all of Europe (including the United King-
dom, Eastern Europe, and Russia) (Table 2). Although consideration of
the number of personnel staffing overseas posts reduces the salience of the
islands, the number and proportion of New Zealand government repre-
sentatives posted to the Pacific Islands is still very impressive. Second, the
diplomatic concentration on the Pacific Islands belies the belief, fostered
by Sir Robert Muldoon, that New Zealand's foreign policy is trade, inso-
far as the Pacific Islands are not a major trading partner of New Zealand.
Third, the extensive diplomatic network in the South Pacific has been
maintained, and in some cases even expanded, during a period of consid-
erable resource constraints and financial stringency for New Zealand
departments, including the foreign service bureaucracy.
The expanded New Zealand diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands
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is an objective measure of the assertion that official and political interest
in the region has increased commensurate with its perceived greater sali-
ence in Wellington. The large number of posts scattered throughout the
Pacific facilitate more frequent visits to the region by officials and politi-
cians, the cultivation of personal relationships with island leaders, and the
maintenance of a closer watching brief over the region generally. New
Zealand's South Pacific diplomacy in the 1990S is based on recognizing the
diversity that exists in the region, on a multidimensional conception of
security, on regionalism, and on a responsive rather than a coercive
approach to the challenges confronting the islands and appropriate
responses to them.
A parallel approach by Australia was labeled "constructive commit-
ment" in a noteworthy address to the Foreign Correspondents' Associa-
tion in Sydney by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans on 23 September 1988
(Evans 1988). For New Zealand, as for Australia, the goals are to under-
write regional economic viability, political stability, and national security;
to foster a strong sense of regional community; to promote shared inter-
ests and problem-solving instrumentalities; and to make their worldwide
diplomatic facilities available for the representation of regional and island
interests. Australia has the advantage over New Zealand of greater
resources. New Zealand has the advantage that, not being the largest
regional actor-Australia is the region's largest economic partner, its big-
gest bilateral aid donor, and its most "tangible" military power-it does
not attract the same degree of suspicion or accusations of acting in a
patronizing manner. Island leaders tend to resent having their interests
"interpreted" to outsiders by the regional metropolitan powers. Speaking
at the Otago Foreign Policy School in 1990, Margaret Taylor, the Papua
New Guinea ambassador to the United States, thanked New Zealand for
cooperative diplomacy while decrying the Australian tendency to "inter-
pret" in such forums as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Taylor
1991,201). Australia also provoked resentment in Kiribati over its fishing
deal with the Soviet Union, in Vanuatu over allegations of Libyan involve-
ment, and in Papua New Guinea because of statements about the crisis in
Bougainville.
This is not to imply that New Zealand has drawn no criticism for a
patronizing attitude, for example for its reactions to the coups in Fiji. The
National government has tried to keep New Zealand's relationship with
Fiji correct, perhaps even reasonably warm. Conceivably, should an
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elected government take over the reins in Fiji after the elections scheduled
for mid-1992, then New Zealand-which is worried about the deteriorat-
ing standards of discipline in the Fiji army-will reconsider restoring
defense relations with Fiji.
Although in a security sense New Zealand traditionally pursued a pol-
icy of strategic denial vis-a.-vis the Soviet Union, in a political sense New
Zealand has-traditionally attempted to sensitize -Washington to regional
concerns and needs. One of the most durable areas of difference between
the United States and the Forum island countries was the question of
licensed tuna fishing. Eventually Washington showed itself attentive to
expressions of unhappiness by regional leaders and of disquiet by Austra-
lia and New Zealand. Corrective action took the form of a multilateral
fisheries treaty in April 1987. The treaty removed a major irritant from
Pacific Islands-United States relations. Denial of the right of island gov-
ernments to license tuna fishing had simply compounded their economic
distress, generated bitterness and resentment toward the United States,
eroded US influence, and undermined US efforts to deny a Pacific pres-
ence to the Soviet Union. By contrast, negotiation of the fisheries treaty
demonstrated long-overdue policy sensitivity toward island concerns. The
treaty is due to expire on 15 June 1993; its renegotiation and ratification
has already been urged by the State Department in a formal report to Con-
gress in 1990 (USDS 1990, 7).
On 19 April 1991, the legislature of the State of Hawai'i adopted a reso-
lution requesting the United States and France to accept the Treaty of
Rarotonga. The explanation for the state's interest was that Hawai'i,
sharing the Pacific waters and populated by many residents of Pacific
ethnicity and cultural heritage, identifies with the concerns and grievances
related to nuclear testing in the Pacific.
While Pacific Islanders are happy to see New Zealand preach the vir-
tues of the Pacific Way to Washington, they do not appreciate sermons
from Wellington on the virtues of constitutional democracy. The coups in
Fiji highlighted a phenomenon that is relevant to the Pacific generally,
namely the stress on inherited political structures engendered by imported
institutions. Allied is the assertion of indigenous rights. But who are the
indigenes, and what rights can they be said to possess as indigenes? In its
coverage of regional affairs, will the New Zealand press always strike the
right balance between legitimate reporting and culturally insensitive intru-
sions? Does New Zealand have sufficient faith in the constitutive princi-
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pIes and core values of its own political system to urge it on Pacific Island-
ers? These are questions that trouble New Zealanders as well as divide
them from their fellow inhabitants of the Pacific (Mulgan 1991; Wilde
1991). By bringing many of these questions to a head, the crisis in Fiji in
1987 posed the most complex challenge ever to New Zealand foreign pol-
icy in the South Pacific.
A .conception and organization of the political order that is deeply
rooted in European civilization could prove an obstacle to New Zealand
identifying itself more and more as a Pacific nation. Yet fundamentally it is
in and of the Pacific. "New Zealand is part of the South Pacific," declared
a Labour cabinet minister in Dunedin in May 1990 (Wilde 1991, 35). A
National cabinet minister repeated the theme in Christchurch in January
1992: "New Zealanders have come to think of themselves as a South
Pacific country" (Graham 1992, 2). As the New Zealand author Witi Ihi-
maera has remarked, the Maori dimension of New Zealand society gives
it a natural and long lineage with Pacific peoples (Ihimaera 1991). Most
New Zealanders would claim Keri Hulme's The Bone People as part of
their cultural heritage, but no English person could do this.
Nor could an Australian. Because of the discrepancy in size, resources,
and power between Australia and all other members of the South Pacific
Forum, and equally because of its cross-regional links with Southeast Asia
and the Indian Ocean, Australia has a larger and longer train of interests.
Even while playing a macromanagerial role in the South Pacific, Australia
tends to stand apart from the region in a manner that New Zealand poli-
cymakers believe is not possible for them. Australia and New Zealand
therefore have parallel but by no means identical interests and roles in the
region. Complementary approaches produce policy coordination and con-
vergence. Australia and New Zealand cannot sustain their South Pacific
policies without taking close account of each other's interests and policies.
Opposition to the program of nuclear testing by France has been one
area of cooperation between Australia and New Zealand over the years.
The testing has not really posed a security threat as such; rather, its dam-
age has been political. The regional position, fully subscribed to by New
Zealand, is simple: If the tests are harmful, they should be ended; if they
cause no harm, they should be conducted on metropolitan French soil.
The strategic justification for French nuclear testing in the Pacific is ques-
tionable. There was a time-lag of nine years between the first atmospheric
and underground tests at Moruroa in 1966 and 1975 respectively. The site
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was originally chosen because its isolation purportedly made it particu-
larly suitable for atmospheric tests. The infrastructure built up after 1966
made Moruroa a convenient but not an essential site for underground test-
ing. Even the strategic justification for the program of nuclear testing is
dubious. The case for a comprehensive test ban has not been disproven
even worldwide; for France, sufficiency rather than overambitious parity
seems adequate tbttsposture of deterrence. Sufficiency is-quite compati-
ble with maintenance of the existing sophistication of nuclear weaponry
and the cessation of further testing. The ending of the Cold War, the dis-
mantling of the Warsaw Pact, the faltering transition to independent
democracies by Eastern European countries, and the reunification of Ger-
many give added poignancy to this criticism of French nuclear testing in
the Pacific. (The unexpected and dramatic announcement on 9 April 1992
by new Prime Minister Pierre Beregevoy that France would suspend
nuclear testing for one year was warmly received in New Zealand and
throughout the region, although the welcome was qualified with the hope
that the temporary suspension would become a permanent cessation.)
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Political and economic considerations underline possible safety and envi-
ronmental apprehensions, as well as harmful social and cultural conse-
quences in the region. The more New Zealand defines its identity in
regional terms, the more it becomes involved in efforts to control environ-
mental damage in the South Pacific. One reason why France has been dis-
missive of regional protests has been a lack of proven environmental dam-
age, as authenticated by the occasional scientific investigation. The work
and findings of a team of scientists from Australia, New Zealand, and
Papua New Guinea that traveled to Tahiti and Moruroa Atoll in October
1983, headed by New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory Director
Hugh Atkinson, was not free of flaws. The Atkinson mission lacked medi-
cally qualified staff, was barred from an independent choice of sampling
sites on Moruroa, and was not permitted to collect sediment from the
lagoon. The 1984 South Pacific Forum communique noted that although
the mission's findings "allayed to some degree the concern that had been
expressed about the short-term effects of the French nuclear tests, they
provided no reassurance about long-term consequences nor in any sense
diminished Forum opposition to testing in any environment" (NZFAR 1984,
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37). There remains a need for an independent team of scientists to investi-
gate the health and environmental effects of French nuclear testing in the
region, for them to have unrestricted freedom of investigation from
French and Tahitian authorities, and for the World Health Organization
to receive complete statistics on rates and causes of mortality.
Nuclear hazards are but one element in the broader environmental
equation. An attempt to develop a regional approach to environm-ental
issues, the South Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP) was
formally launched in I980. Its major achievements include the Action Plan
for Managing the Natural Resources and Environment (SPREP Action
Plan, I983), and the Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources
and Environment (SPREP Convention, I986). Its ongoing program covers
such areas as watershed management; quality control of island and
coastal waters; management of natural resources, wastes, and pollution;
and protection of historic sites.
Indications that the Japanese intended to dump low-level radioactive
waste in the northern Pacific in the I97os, and again in I982, sensitized the
peoples of the Pacific to the issue of toxic waste disposal. The I985 South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ, or Treaty of Rarotonga) prohib-
ited the dumping of any nuclear waste in the region (Article 7) and called
for parties to support the conclusion of a global convention on the matter.
The SPREP Convention was adopted in Noumea on 25 November I986
after four years of negotiations. Its area comprises the exclusive economic
zones of all Pacific Island countries and territories, as well as areas of the
high seas that those zones enclose on all sides (see map, p II-Ed).
The convention is concerned with the protection of the marine environ-
ment against pollution from land-based sources and seabed activities. It
includes two protocols dealing with the dumping at sea of toxic and haz-
ardous wastes, and the testing of nuclear explosive devices. The prohibi-
tion on dumping of radioactive wastes applies irrespective of whether or
not such dumping causes pollution. The convention obliges the parties to
prevent, reduce, and control pollution from any source; sets up a blacklist
of substances that cannot be put into the ocean under any circumstances,
such as mercury, oil, and certain plastics; and requires special permission
for dumping some other substances, such as arsenic, lead, and nickel.
Although nuclear testing is not prohibited, the parties are committed to
sound environmental management in regard to the consequences of
nuclear testing. The prohibition on future dumping constituted a signifi-
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cant concession by France and the United States, both of which did sign
the convention on 25 November. SPREP thus constitutes a significant inter-
national agency for the protection of the marine environment of the
regIOn.
New Zealand has supported SPREP materially and politically since its
inception. At New Zealand initiative, the I990 South Pacific Forum meet-
ing in Vanuatu set up a subcommittee of officials to draw up a blueprint
for the development of SPREP, in recognition of the need to develop its
capacity and autonomy if it were to meet the growing environmental
needs of the region and attract international environmental funding and
coordinate the large numbers of environmental aid donors, nongovern-
mental organizations, agencies, and projects active in the region. The sub-
committee was funded by New Zealand, met in Nadi, Fiji, shortly after
the July I990 Forum meeting and produced a report for Forum leaders
that guided discussion at the SPREP intergovernmental meeting in Noumea
from 24 to 28 September I990. The broad regional consensus of the meet-
ing was that SPREP should be set up as a fully autonomous regional organi-
zation with the mandate and capacity to mobilize, manage, and coordi-
nate environmental protection in the South Pacific. The I99I Forum
communique welcomed the strengthening of SPREP by its establishment as
a fully autonomous regional organization headquartered in Western
Samoa (paragraph I2), and the entry into force of the SPREP Convention
(paragraph I3).
The New Zealand government gave diplomatic support and the New
Zealand people gave emotional support to the campaign to eradicate the
practice of driftnet (wall of death) fishing in the Pacific Ocean. The
driftnet fishing issue is regarded as a textbook case of regional coopera-
tion. Within two years of launch, the campaign resulted in Resolution 44/
225 of the United Nations General Assembly, in which member states
agreed to phase out driftnetting in the South Pacific by I July I99I and in
other oceans by mid-I992. The importance of a united regional approach
was underlined when Japan, which had tried to substitute a much weaker
resolution in the General Assembly, announced cessation of driftnet fish-
ing in the South Pacific a year ahead of the UN deadline.
The campaign to bring an end to driftnet fishing in Pacific waters offers
another example of the close regional collaboration between Australia
and New Zealand (as well as the United States-a point not lost on the
Japanese). In February I990, the two countries decided to investigate the
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possibility of joint surveillance flights over the region aimed at spotting
driftnetting. The joint flights by the Royal Australian Air Force and the
Royal New Zealand Air Force began in November 1990-the start of the
driftnet season. Through the flights, Prime Minister Bob Hawke ex-
plained in a statement on 2 November, the Forum Fisheries Agency would
be provided with important data on the frequency and range of driftnet-
ting activities in regional waters (Hawke 1990,813).
One of the major arguments against driftnetting was its threat to the
ecological balance: it violated the code of sustainable exploitation of
marine resources. The search for sustainable development (development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the needs of
future generations) poses a particular dilemma for the poorer countries.
The Pacific Island countries bear little responsibility for causing such
global environmental problems as climate change, ozone depletion, and
toxic waste disposal-subsistence societies traditionally practice quite
sound environmental management of their resources. Yet the islands are
asked to assume some responsibility for the management of these prob-
lems in order to ameliorate their worst effects.
Climate change is probably the most disturbing of these problems in the
South Pacific because of the potentially devastating scale of its impact.
Island countries are not guilty of significant greenhouse emissions, but
could suffer severely from their effects. Soil erosion, increased frequency
and intensity of cyclones, destruction of land resources, and-the worst
nightmare-the total inundation of some atolls by rising sea levels are all
possible (Ferguson 1991). In other areas, for example, deforestation,
Pacific Islanders might be said to bear some responsibility for ecological
degradation. Island countries depend on agricultural, forest, and marine
resources that in some cases are being pushed beyond the point of sus-
tainability by the pressures of rising populations and the needs of a cash
economy.
New Zealand will inevitably be involved in efforts to monitor the situa-
tion, to engage in scientific studies, to assign probabilities to various disas-
ter scenarios, and to collaborate in regional and international efforts to
contain the most damaging impacts in the South Pacific of activities out-
side it. New Zealand also has specific projects for the improvement of
national environmental planning and management in Pacific Island coun-
tries. Major constraints in tackling environmental threats include inade-
quate policy guidelines, poor interagency coordination, and insufficient
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staff training and experience, as well as scarce resources. For this reason
human resources development accounts for a substantial proportion of
New Zealand's bilateral aid to the region. New Zealand tries to ensure
that its aid is well designed and environmentally sensitive, for example,
support for forestry development projects in Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, and Western Samoa.
CONCLUSION
Increasingly complex and diverse international relations in the South
Pacific are an emerging reality. Decolonization in the region began in the
early 1960s and was virtually completed in the 1980s. One major remain-
ing exception is New Caledonia. On this issue, New Zealand has worked
alongside island governments in the effort to transform New Caledonia
into an independent Pacific neighbor. Foreign Minister McKinnon claims
to have gone out of his way to develop the relationship with France in the
South Pacific partly in order to ease New Caledonia's transition to inde-
pendence (McKinnon 1992).
The period of decolonization also saw the transformation of the pre-
mier regional institutions. From being instruments of colonial control,
they-or their replacements-became vehicles for the promotion of
regional welfare as defined by Pacific Island peoples themselves. During
the 1980s, Pacific Islanders reevaluated their attitudes toward extrare-
gional powers whose policies and activities impinge on regional politics.
Countries of the region are no longer content to be pawns in a great game
being played out by others. They have their own priorities and are pre-
pared to evaluate outsiders' actions on the basis of their responsiveness to
regional aspirations. The ebbing of the Cold War means that Western
policymakers must -turn their attention away from strategic denial of the
region to adversaries and concentrate on the maintenance of their own
access. The Bolger government of New Zealand has pursued an easy and
relaxed relationship. For example, the foreign minister has met almost all
island leaders and is accessible to them by telephone (McKinnon 1992).
One consequence of these changes in the way the regional nations view
the outside world has been that the established major actors in regional
affairs in turn have been forced to redefine interests and reassess priorities.
Some previously major actors have experienced declining influence in the
region. Britain, for example, has more or less faded from the South Seas.
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Others whose profiles were barely visible just a few decades ago, particu-
larly countries of East and Northeast Asia such as Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan, have become more salient.
For New Zealand, the South Pacific has undergone a dramatic upgrad-
ing in priority. The fourth Labour government (1984-199°) turned around
from viewing the South Pacific as its backyard to viewing it as its front
yard. As with houses, so with New Zealand foreign policy: the most
immediate, visible, and distinctive impressions will be those of its dealings
in the region. Foreign Minister McKinnon prefers to think of the South
Pacific not as New Zealand's backyard but as its home region (McKinnon
1992). It is a region of the highest foreign policy significance for New
Zealand because of fundamental, long-standing, and largely unchanging
interests. New Zealand is an important destination for many Pacific
Island students and migrants. In a speech to Wellington Rotarians on 18
May 1989, Foreign Minister Russell Marshall pointed out that of the thir-
teen Forum island country leaders at the time, no fewer than eight had
studied or spent important periods of their earlier lives in New Zealand.
Such experiences foster a sense of intimacy within the Pacific family of
nations. A good example of New Zealanders' affection for and affinity
with the Pacific Islands came in the wake of the tropical cyclone that
devastated Western Samoa in December 1991. A telethon appeal raised
NZ$1 million, matched equally by the government. In addition, unem-
ployed New Zealanders were flown to Western Samoa to help with repair
and reconstruction work at public expense and without interruption to
their unemployment benefits. The frequency of disasters in the Pacific
Islands has led the government to increase the budgeted allocation for
relief operations from Nz$0.6S million in 1990-91 to NZ$3 million in
1991-92 (NZMERT 1992).
Furthermore, the definition of the appropriate role for New Zealand in
the South Pacific is affected by regional expectations of New Zealand.
Certainly New Zealand is looked to for help and assistance in hurricane
relief, civic action, search and rescue, fisheries, organizing international
opposition to French nuclear testing, communicating regional anger over
predatory fishing practices by distant-water fishing nations, and the like.
An underlying assumption in the Pacific Islands is that New Zealand,
along with some other countries, has a special responsibility to help pre-
serve the islands' well-being and security within the region economically
as well as politically, and to take a leading role in articulating regional
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concerns in all appropriate international forums. In fulfillment of such
expectations, New Zealand has not hesitated in the past to communicate
grievances on tuna poaching to Washington and on nuclear testing to
Paris.
The trust in which New Zealand is held in the islands was useful in
1990, when a New Zealand frigate was provided as a venue for talks
between representatives of the Papua New Guinea government and lead-
ers of the rebel movement in Bougainville. The New Zealand role was one
of facilitator: not imposing settlements, but supporting the parties them-
selves in efforts to deal with a complex mix of nationalist, land tenure,
religious, tribal, and economic issues (Nottage 1991).
For all this, New Zealand remains in constant danger of becoming a bit
player in the South Pacific, as is illustrated by a small but symptomatic
action in relation to radio broadcasts. The 1986 Royal Commission on
Broadcasting identified the 7.5 kw transmitter used by Radio New
Zealand's international service as the second smallest shortwave service in
the world: only Uruguay's 5 kw station was smaller. In 1989 the transmit-
ter was replaced by a 100 kw transmitter, which is not very powerful by
international standards, with other countries spending millions of dollars
on capital and operating costs of 250-500 kw stations. The new more
powerful station was intended to provide listeners with reliable and con-
venient access to New Zealand-sourced news and information on devel-
opments of regional or community interest. It was accepted that Radio
New Zealand could not compete with the players in the big league-Aus-
tralia, Britain, France, Germany, the then Soviet Union, and the United
States-on world news. Radio New Zealand would cover world events,
but would not seek to compete with or duplicate programs broadcast by
the major shortwave operators. Instead, it would be more of a dedicated
effort using, for example, Pacific Island language broadcasts and items of
specific regional interest. The decision on the upgraded service was made
by cabinet on 22 August 1988. Its political character was underscored in
the decision, made at the same time, to fund the service from within the
existing budget of the Ministry of External Relations and Trade.
The major actors in the Pacific Islands are likely to be Australia, the
United States, France, and Japan. Probably New Zealand's most valuable
role in regional affairs, and therefore in international relations, is and will
be to act as the South Pacific interlocutor to those outside powers whose
activities most impinge on regional affairs: in security, economic, politi-
cal, and environmental spheres. I would interpret Russell Marshall's
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remarks, quoted at the start of this paper, as suggesting that New
Zealand's South Pacific policy has become integral to its international
identity. It is also helpful to New Zealand in some of its own international
pursuits: the New Zealand candidacy for a two-year term on the UN
Security Council for 1993-94 was endorsed at the twenty-second South
Pacific Forum meeting held in Palikir, Pohnpei, in July 1991 (NZMERT
1991b,36).
The recommendations of the official New Zealand task force (Hender-
son 1990), published in May 1990, indicated a willingness to formalize the
shift from the hegemonism of the colonial era to a partnership of equals in
a genuinely regional community. The ability of outside powers to engage
the attention of Pacific Island leaders may well depend on their success in
translating such pious goodwill into concrete policy initiatives. Pacific
Island countries have become political actors in their own right, and this
will be the core fact around which the new international relations of the
South Pacific will revolve.
THIS IS A REVISED and updated version ofa paper prepared for a workshop on the
South Pacific held at Pennsylvania State University, 29-30 May 1991. I am grate-
ful for documentary and interview assistance provided by the New Zealand Min-
ister and Ministry of External Relations and Trade in Wellington. I would also
like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of the paper.
Notes
I The business approach to defense was updated to the post-Cold War situa-
tion by Hugh Fletcher, chief executive of one of New Zealand's biggest compa-
nies, Fletcher Challenge. Speaking to a meeting of the International Association
of Business Communicators in Wellington on 26 March 1992, he questioned the
need for a defense force "against an unnameable enemy" and suggested that the
money would be better spent on growth-creating activities (Otago Daily Times
[Dunedin], 27 March 1992).
2 This is not to underestimate the ability of the Soviet Union (or of other
major powers, eg France in 1985) to engage in politically stupid behavior. A Soviet
intelligence agent, Anvar Kadyrov, who entered New Zealand on a forged British
passport on 4 March 1991, was arrested on 7 March for trying to obtain a false
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New Zealand passport using certified birth papers of a New Zealander who had
died in childhood. On 21 March, Prime Minister Jim Bolger summoned the Soviet
ambassador to express New Zealand's concern. The ambassador said he would
communicate the concern to Moscow, but he did not believe the affair would
damage bilateral relations because it was all a misunderstanding.
3 The intensity of the anti-American sentiments in some of the submissions to
the Corner committee would probably surprise many New Zealanders. "New
Zealand should not identify with the exploiters and oppressors.... New
Zealand should not have any military alliance with such a dishonourable coun-
try.... New Zealand should not have any military alliance with such a despica-
ble country.... America has no morals in international affairs.... In simple
words they are liars, exploiters, killers," noted one submission (Corner 1986, 26).
4 The coups in Fiji presented a moral dilemma for New Zealand. In 1983 and
1984, of students from Fiji given official development assistance awards to study
in New Zealand, ethnic Indians made up IS of 19 and 12 of 23 respectively. For
1988 and 1989, the numbers of ethnic Indian students had dropped to 2 of 8 and 4
of 19 respectively (New Zealand Hansard 1990, II7). This raised the unhappy
thought that New Zealand scholarships were being administered on racist crite-
ria, but no public fuss seems to have been made about the issue.
5 That is, they are either wholly obtained in the preferential area or partly
manufactured there, with, in the latter instance, the Pacific Island or New
Zealand content exceeding a nominated level.
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Abstract
Over the past two decades, New Zealanders have begun increasingly to identify
the South Pacific as their home region. The troubles that hit the South Pacific in
the 1980s accelerated and deepened this process. Official and political interest in
the region has increased commensurate with its perceived greater salience in Well-
ington. The large number of New Zealand diplomatic posts scattered throughout
the Pacific Islands facilitate more frequent visits to the region by officials and poli-
ticians, the cultivation of personal relationships with island leaders, and the
maintenance of a closer watching brief over the region generally. New Zealand's
South Pacific diplomacy in the 1990S is based on recognizing the diversity that
exists in the region, on a multidimensional conception of security, on regional-
ism, on a responsive rather than a coercive approach to the challenges confront-
ing the Pacific Islands, and on appropriate responses to those challenges. These
propositions are demonstrated on security, economic, political, and environmen-
tal dimensions.
